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Abstract:  Darwin’s extensive writings may seem antiquated to current thinkers with their predilections for 
cognitive science, neuroscience, and analytic branches of philosophy. He showed that morphologies are 
not simply taxonomic distinctions that allow classification into species. They describe living animals, hence 
morphologies-in-motion: animate forms of life engaged in synergies of meaningful movement, all of which 
are testimony to animal sentience. 
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Kudos to Arthur Reber (2016) for centering attention on the evolutionary origins of mind, 
consciousness, subjectivity, and other specifying labels for “mental” phenomena. Several 
additional points can be made on behalf of the basic evolutionary perspective that Reber sets 
forth (see also Sheets-Johnstone 1998, 1999/2011, 2009). The points are critical in the sense of 
acknowledging and carrying forward earlier empirical research. The points are thus not critical in 
a counter-Reber sense, but in the sense of elaborating Reber’s thesis. Science, after all, unlike 
the arts, including literature, builds on past empirical evidence. Darwin’s extensive writings may 
seem relics to many modern 20th-21st century thinkers whose predilections for today’s cognitive 
science, neuroscience, and analytic branches of philosophy steer them clear of such seemingly 
antiquated studies. There is an apparent ignorance of Darwin’s field studies, which ranged 
worldwide as well as species-wide. Field studies of animals are essential to knowing animals as 
they are in their real-life, real-time, everyday lives.  
 
1. Writing about the mental capacities of nonhuman animals without reference to Darwin’s 
writings — or anything beyond The Origin of Species — puts one at a disadvantage. One 
bypasses empirical evidence that documents the thesis one is putting forth. Reber’s first section, 
“The Origins of the CBC Model,” is an example. His 21st century engagement with a small green 
caterpillar is a microscopic portrait of Darwin’s 19th century engagement with worms. The last 
book that Darwin (2010 [1897]) wrote — The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action 
of Worms with Observations on Their Habits — provides straightforward evidence of the 
intelligence of worms. It should be required reading for anyone concerned with animal 
sentience. In addition to writing in fine detail about geological effects of the action of worms, 
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Darwin (2010 [1897]) describes the actions themselves, including a sizable section on the 
intelligence of worms, concluding with the following observations: 
 
If worms are able to judge, either before drawing or after having drawn an object close to the 
mouths of their burrows, how best to drag it in, they must acquire some notion of its general 
shape. This they probably acquire by touching it in many places with the anterior extremity of 
their bodies, which serves as a tactile organ. It may be well to remember how perfect the sense 
of touch becomes in a man when born blind and deaf, as are worms. If worms have the power of 
acquiring some notion, however rude, of the shape of an object and of their burrows, as seems 
to be the case, they deserve to be called intelligent; for they then act in nearly the same manner 
as would a man under similar circumstances. (p. 99)  
 
A page later, in relation to the idea that “worms, although standing low in the scale of 
organization, possess some degree of intelligence,” he states: “This will strike every one as very 
improbable; but it may be doubted whether we know enough about the nervous system of the 
lower animals to justify our natural distrust of such a conclusion. With respect to the small size 
of the cerebral ganglia, we should remember what a mass of inherited knowledge, with some 
power of adapting means to an end, is crowded into the minute brain of a worker-ant” (ibid., p. 
100). Darwin 1981 [1871] actually called attention to the brain of ants many years earlier (p. 
145). 
 
2. The error Reber identifies as a category error is from an evolutionary perspective an empirical 
error. No appeal need be made to the propriety of “anthropomorphism” in seeing dogs at play 
as being “happy” (Reber, p. 3). Here again one can reference Darwin (1965 [1872]), specifically 
what he terms “high spirits” and “cheerfulness” in The Expression of Emotions in Man and 
Animals (pp. 210-212). What Darwin describes and in some instances shows graphically in his 
pan-animate study of emotions is noteworthy, all the moreso with respect to humans’ common 
judgment of emotion as simply a facial phenomenon. As Darwin shows, the whole body is 
involved in emotion. It is thus not surprising that emotions move through animate bodies and 
move them to move (Sheets-Johnstone 1999/2009, 2006). There is a dynamic congruity 
between emotions and movement. Not only would humans be otherwise incapable of feigning 
or restraining an emotion, but also nonhuman primates would be incapable of “tactical 
deception” (Whiten and Byrne, 1988; see also Altmann, 1967, on “comsigns” and Sheets-
Johnstone, 2008, pp. 295-299 on the intercorporeal relevance of Altmann’s concept).  
 
3. Darwin’s extensive studies of the mental powers and moral sense of animals should also be 
required reading. One might ask whether 20th and 21st century scientists can claim to have a 
more sophisticated empirical knowledge of the mental powers and moral sense of nonhuman 
and human animals on the basis of brain studies. In The Descent of Man and Selection in 
Relation to Sex, Darwin (1981 [1871]) devotes two whole chapters to the mental powers of “Man 
and the Lower Animals” and further chapters to development, i.e., the phylogenetic heritage of 
Man, and to intellectual and moral faculties. Perhaps particularly relevant to Reber’s target 
article are Darwin’s (1981 [1871]) observations concerning the reasoning faculties of animals, 
observations that obviously complement his later observations of worms: 
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Of all the faculties of the human mind, it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason stands at the 
summit. Few persons any longer dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals 
may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve. It is a significant fact, that the more 
the habits of any particular animal are studied by a naturalist, the more he attributes to reason 
and the less to unlearnt instincts. In future chapters we shall see that some animals extremely 
low in the scale apparently display a certain amount of reason. (p. 46) 
 
Darwin later quotes a South American muleteer, “I will not give you the mule whose step is 
easiest, but la mas racional--the one that reasons best,” and adds the following comment from 
Humboldt with respect to “la mas racional”: “[T]his popular expression, dictated by long 
experience, combats the system of animated machines, better perhaps than all the arguments 
of speculative philosophy” (ibid. p. 48). 
 
In sum, Darwin’s worldwide studies show that morphologies are not simply taxonomic 
distinctions that allow classification into species. Morphologies describe living animals, hence 
morphologies-in-motion: animate forms of life engaged in synergies of meaningful movement, 
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